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Introduction
The nature of time is a debated issue in philosophy. Some philosophers have concluded
that time does not exist. For example, J.M.E. McTaggart in the early 20th century claimed that
time was illusory. He defined time as the appearance of temporal order. He argued that the
positions that make up this temporal order were arranged into two series: the A series and the B
series. Whereas the A series was ordered according to the positions’ properties such as being
present or being two days past, the B series was ordered according to the positions’ two-place
relations such as two days earlier than or simultaneous with. McTaggart argued that there was
an inherent contradiction in any position t in the A series because it had to possess the properties
of being past, present, and future all at once. This contradiction meant that the A series was not
possible. Furthermore, since the order in the B series was dependent on the relations positions
had to each other in terms of the properties that constitute the order in the A series, there could
not be a B series either. As a result, time was illusory (McTaggart, 1993).1 Regardless of the
conclusion philosophers come to about the existence of time, they make assumptions and debate
about the topology of time. For example, McTaggart’s argument holds only if time is assumed
to be a single, continuous, linear temporal order of events. While some philosophers argue that
time is an entity independent of the things that occupy it, others argue that it is relational.
Philosophers such as McTaggart, Plato, and Augustine have a view called “Platonism with
Respect to Time”, “Absolutism with Respect to Time”, or “Substantivalism with Respect to
1

Parmenides and Zeno of Elea also argued that change was illusory. Parmenides argued that since nothing was

logically impossible, and change required a transition from nothing to something, there could not be anything that
changed. This implied that the whole universe was static. Since there was no change, there could not be time.
Taking this idea from Parmenides, Zeno argued that it was impossible to get from one point to another because of
the assumed continuity of space. Thus, he also concluded that motion was illusory (Cohen, Curd, & Reeve, 2000).

1

Time”.2 Such philosophers argue that time is like a background, an empty container, or a
substance that has a separate existence from the objects that occupy it3. As such, the properties
of time are uniform throughout and are unaffected by the motion of other objects.4 However, not
all philosophers share this view on the nature of time. Philosophers such as Aristotle, Leibniz,
and Descartes argued that time should be defined in terms of relative change or motion. This
view of time is referred to as “Reductionism with Respect to Time” or “Relationism with
Respect to Time”. Such philosophers argue that time is defined by the relations between events
or things that undergo change or motion (Markosian, 2008).5
The debate in philosophy about the nature of time mirrors the debate that occurs in
physics. While some physicists claim that time is illusory, some claim that time is an
independent entity and still others claim that time is relative. Some physicists like Julian
Barbour (2008) claim that time as an independent entity is an illusion.6 In “The Nature of Time”,
he states, “Unlike the Emperor dressed in nothing, time is nothing dressed in clothes. I can only
describe the clothes” (p.2). Among the physicists that have treated time as absolute is Newton.
In the 17th century, Isaac Newton claimed that there were two types of time: absolute time and
relative time. Whereas absolute time referred to an entity or uniform background that existed
independently of the physical bodies, relative time referred to the quantitative values obtained

2

Although these philosophers share McTaggart’s view on the nature of time, not all will agree with his conclusion

that time is illusory.
3

Under this view, time is also separated from space.

4

By objects, I mean any physical system.

5

Such views are also held with respect to space. However, since the focus of this thesis is time, I will not discuss in

detail philosopher’s views on space.
6

For a detailed account of Barbour’s argument, please refer to his book The End of Time (2000).
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from the measurement of the succession of events. That is, Newton distinguished between the
real nature of time (absolute time) and the way time could be perceived (relative time).
According to Newton both absolute time and absolute space were necessary in order for there to
be absolute motion.7 This was because absolute motion could only be determined by something
stationary—i.e. by something that was absolutely at rest.8 Newton believed that not having this
foundation would lead to an infinite regress because an infinite amount of relative motions would
have to be added to obtain an absolute value for motion. In order for true motion to be generated
or altered, a force had to be applied to a body. The application of this force was both a necessary
and sufficient condition for absolute or true motion to occur. However, the application of forces
such as gravity was neither necessary nor sufficient for relative motion.9 This is demonstrated in
Prong A and Prong B. In Prong A, Newton focuses on showing how the application of a force is
not necessary for relative motion. He imagined a scenario similar to the following: a body A is
surrounded by a group of bodies B. If the same amount of force is applied to all the bodies in B,
the position of the bodies in B will remain the same relative to each other, but A will be in
relative motion to B. This scenario shows how if motion is relative, then motion can occur
without the application of any force. In Prong B, Newton focuses on showing how the
application of a force is not sufficient for relative motion. This can be shown by a similar
scenario as the one described above. If the same amount of force is applied to both A and B,
then the position of all the bodies will remain the same relative to each other. Thus, there is no
7
8
9

Absolute time and absolute space are these foundations.
For Newton, something was absolutely at rest only if it was at rest with respect to all the bodies in the universe.
Newton uses the rotating bucket experiment to prove something similar. He wanted to show how an effect such as

centrifugal endeavor (the degree that the water climbs up the sides of the bucket) is necessary and sufficient for true
rotational motion to occur but not for relative rotational motion.

3

relative motion. This scenario shows how if motion is relative, then it cannot occur despite the
application of force.10
Newton’s view on the nature of time and space was dominant in physics and was the
standard approach to time and space in classical mechanics until the 20th century (Rynasiewicz,
2004). However, in 1905, Einstein demonstrated that both time and space were relative. In the
theory of special relativity, he showed that an absolute measure of simultaneity was not possible.
He also established the interdependence between time and space and the relational nature of
space-time. As a result, Newton’s absolute space and absolute time were replaced by
Minkowskian space-time. Furthermore, Einstein also demonstrated with the theory of general
relativity that physical bodies affect the structure of space-time. Thus, space-time cannot exist
independently of physical bodies (Einstein, 2005).11
Regardless of the whether physicists have had an absolute or relational approach to time,
they have tried to find a method to measure time that is dependent on physical events. For
example, despite Newton’s claim about the necessity of absolute time, he realized that a measure
of absolute time could not be obtained other than by using relative time (Rynasiewicz, 2004). In
10

It is interesting to note how Newton’s concern about how the causes of true motion such as forces and the effects

of true rotational motion such as centrifugal endeavor are not necessary or sufficient for relative motion are
manifested in the Twin Paradox four centuries later. In the Twin Paradox, one of two identical twins, Twin A, is
sent on a rocket traveling at the speed of light while the other twin, Twin B, stays on Earth. From the frame of
reference of Twin A, it is Twin B that is moving away at the speed of light. From the frame of reference of Twin B,
it is Twin A that is moving away at the speed of light. However, when Twin A returns to earth, Twin B has aged
considerably more than Twin A. If relational motion is real motion, then both twins should have aged at the same
rate because from each other’s frame of reference, it is the other twin that is traveling at the speed of light while he
is at rest. However, it is only Twin A that has aged faster than Twin B (Torretti, 1999).
11

This will be explored in greater detail in the implications section of this thesis.
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particular, astronomers have been trying to find an accurate way to measure time since ancient
times. For example, having found that there is a 15 minute discrepancy between solar time and
sidereal time, Hipparchos preferred to use sidereal time to predict lunar eclipses because it
proved to be more accurate. This was until astronomers noticed that the moon had an effect on
the rotation of the Earth in the 1890s. However, it wasn’t until 1952 that ephemeris time12
replaced sidereal time as the preferred measure of duration. Ephemeris time was a more accurate
measure of duration because it took into account Newton’s gravitational law as it applied to the
solar system.13 Ephemeris time was obtained by using the energy of this system. The total
energy of the system E is given by the sum of the system’s kinetic energy T and its potential
energy V. It is a system’s potential energy that is defined in terms if Newton’s law of gravity.
As such, it takes into account the disturbance that the gravity of other bodies in a system can
produce on the motion of the body that will be used to obtain a time variable. Since the energy
in a closed system is conserved, the total energy E of the system is constant in time. If an
observer knows the values for the constants G, E, and mi, and takes two successive
measurements of the whole system, then the value for time variable δt can be determined based
on displacements of the positions of all the bodies in the system. Ephemeris time was used as
the standard measurement of time duration until the atomic time was introduced in 1979
(Barbour, 2008).

12

Ephemeris time is given by δt which is derived from the displacements and distances of the positions of celestial

bodies given the constants G for gravity, E for total energy, and mi for the mass of a body in the system.
13

In order for this to apply, the solar system must be closed. That is, there are no external bodies that can

significantly disturb its motion.
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In classical mechanics, the energy of the system represented by the Hamiltonian H14 is
used as the generator of time translations. When the system is not affected by any timedependent external forces, H is the constant E. This is the case with the solar system that gives
ephemeris time. However, most systems are affected by external time-dependent forces. In
such systems, H is dependent on time measure t (Hilgevoord, 1996). The t value represents an
external and independent measure of time that, much like Newton’s absolute time, is assumed to
exist but it is unobserved. Some physicists such as Jan Hilgevoord (2002) claim that the idea
that t represents a measure of time is a misconception. This is because t represents a space-time
coordinate and as such, it is not a measure of physical phenomena. Instead, it is a mathematical
tool used to map physical events. A measure of time can only be derived from systems
containing dynamical variables. Since there is no dynamical variable for time, t is used to
represent both the space-time coordinate and the dynamical variable. As a result, space-time
coordinates are equivocated with dynamic variables for time. However, time as measured by a
dynamic variable is not the same as the coordinate t. The use of the notation t to represent time
obscures the fact that there are different conceptions of time.15 This equivocation also occurs in
quantum mechanics because is it modeled after classical Hamiltonian mechanics.16
Whereas ignoring the distinction between space-time coordinates and dynamical
variables is not as problematic in classical mechanics, it is in quantum mechanics. In classical
mechanics, the difference between dynamical variables such as q and the space-time coordinates
such as x can be ignored because it is assumed that there is no discrepancy between the
14

H is the function of the canonical variables p which represents momentum and q which represents position.

15

Paul Busch (1990) discusses the different conceptions of time in the article “The Time-Energy Uncertainty

Relation.” He distinguishes between external time, internal time, and observable time.
16

This will be explored in greater detail in the next section of this thesis.
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properties of a physical system and the properties of space-time. That is, both the dynamical
variables of physical systems and the space-time coordinates have well-defined continuous
measurement values ranging from -∞ to +∞. However, the properties of physical systems that
are studied in classical mechanics are different from those studied in quantum mechanics.
Whereas classical mechanics studies physical systems such as rigid bodies and point particles
(Hilgevoord, 2002), quantum mechanics studies physical systems that can be described as matter
waves. In 1924, Louis de Broglie proposed that subatomic entities such as an electron possess
properties pertaining to both particles and wave phenomena. For example, recent experiments
such as the double-slit experiment showed how the nature of electron is altered by the measuring
apparatus/configuration.17 If one slit is covered, then the electron will pass through the slit to
produce a pattern that indicates particle behavior. That is, there is no interference pattern.
However, if both slits are left open, the electron will pass through both of them to produce an
interference pattern that indicates behavior of wave phenomena. As a result, measurements
cannot always provide definite values as in classical mechanics. Instead, measurement values
are given in terms of probability. That is, |Ψ|2 is used to represent the probability of finding the
electron in a certain position.18 De Broglie proposed that the connection between the particle and
wave nature of the electron involved Planck’s constant. He found that the wavelength λ of an
electron was given by Planck’s constant h divided by its momentum mv (Greenstein & Zajonc,
1997). The introduction of Planck’s constant as the solution to the black-body problem showed

17

In a double-slit experiment, an electron is shot through a wall with two slits to be captured by a screen (Auletta,

2001).
18

Ψ represents the state of the system.
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that systems can have discrete energy values.19 The discreteness observed by Planck’s solution
was generalized into the Quantum Postulate which states that the total energy of quantum
systems E is composed of a definite number of discrete energy packets given by the frequency
value v of the system multiplied by Planck’s constant (E=hv). This was the beginning of
quantum mechanics (Auletta, 2001). The discreteness observed at the quantum level is contrary
to the assumption in classical mechanics that measurement values are always continuous.
Due to the nature of subatomic entities, ignoring the distinction between space-time
coordinates and dynamic variables contributes to the problem of time in quantum mechanics. In
quantum mechanics, dynamical variables are represented by operators. However, if time t is
expected to be external and independent of physical systems and is expected to have continuous
values that range from -∞ to +∞ like space-time coordinates do, then there is no self-adjoint
operator that can represent time as an observable.20 As a result, time has to be represented by the

19

A black body is a hollow object built of a material that keeps its internal temperature constant and uniform. These

two properties of its temperature cause the electrical charges to also move in a continuous manner. This continuous
movement produces electromagnetic waves. Since the movement is always occurring, the electromagnetic waves
are always produced. Because of its nature, it is mathematically hypothesized that the intensity of the radiation
emitted by the black body would increase infinitely. This would result in an explosion called an ultraviolet
catastrophe. However, this is not what is experimentally observed. Instead, after the radiation reaches a certain
level, the emission and absorption of waves reaches a level of stability. After this, the amount of radiation emitted
tappers off until it stops. The discrepancy between mathematical models and experimental observations is called the
black-body problem. Planck, however, solved this by introducing the idea that energy for physical systems such as
black bodies is discrete. He proposed that the energy of black bodies is composed of a definite number of energy
elements having 6.55 x 10-27 erg/s. This number is known as Plack’s constant h (Auletta, 2001).
20

An observable is property that can be measured like a system’s position, momentum, angle, spin, etc. It is a

dynamical variable.
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parameter t. If time cannot be represented by an operator like the spatial coordinates, then the
close connection between x, y, z and t established by Einstein using the Lorentz transformations
in the theory of relativity cannot be mirrored in quantum mechanics.21 Thus, time is treated
independently from space in standard quantum mechanics (Hilgevoord, 2002). Standard
quantum mechanics assumes a Newtonian conception of time and space despite the fact that the
theory of relativity proves that this should not be done.
Given the problems with time in quantum mechanics, the purpose of my thesis is to
explore its role. I aim to gain a better understanding of the nature of time and the nature of the
problems associated with time. For example, I aim to explore the problem associated with the
energy-time uncertainty relation due to the lack of a universal operator for time. Using
Hilgevoord’s work, I will explore the idea that if a measure of time is to be obtained in quantum
mechanics, then time has to be a property of physical systems that can only be measured in
relation to other systems. As such, time cannot be independent of physical systems. This
implies that there cannot be time without physical systems. As a result, I will show how the
philosophical position of “Relationism with Respect to Time” provides an accurate account of
the nature of time that is consistent with observations made in physics. In order to achieve this, I
will: 1) present Hilgevoord’s argument about the problems of time in quantum mechanics; 2)
provide an account of the ontology of time based on Hilgevoord’s work; and 3) provide an
analysis of the implications of what I am proposing in connection to Einstein’s theory of special
and general relativity in hopes of showing that his insights can and should be applied to quantum
mechanics.

21

This will be explored in greater detail in the next section of this thesis.
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Hilgevoord’s Exposition of the Problem of Time in Quantum Mechanics
In his article “Time in Quantum Mechanics,” Jan Hilgevoord (2002) claims that the “root
of the problem of time in quantum mechanics” has its origins in a conceptual error that has been
carried from classical mechanics (p. 301). This is due to the fact that classical Hamiltonian
mechanics serves as a model for quantum mechanics. Hilgevoord explains how in Hamiltonian
mechanics, Qk and IIk represent any generalized canonical conjugate variables that describe a
physical system. Conjugate variables are a pair of variables that have a relationship such that
any change in one variable will reflect in the other variable. For example, position q and
momentum p are conjugate variables. Any change in the position of a system will reflect a
change in the momentum of a system. If Qk and IIk are used to describe a system that constitutes
a collection of point particles, these variables can be represented by the pair of conjugate
variables describing the positions qn and momenta pn of the particles in that system. He also
explains how in physics (except for general relativity), it is assumed that these physical systems
are situated in a Euclidean space which is both continuous and independent from the physical
systems that are being described.22 The points constituting this Euclidean space are given by the
Cartesian coordinates x, y, z and a time parameter t. As Hilgevoord states, “Together with the
time parameter t, the [Cartesian coordinates x=(x, y, z)] form the coordinates of a continuous,
independently given, space-time background” (p.301). Hilgevoord states that although there is a
numerical identity relation qx=x, qy=y, qz=z between the dynamical variable of a point particle q

22

It is important to note that physical systems in special relativity are not situated in Euclidean space. Instead, they

are situated in Minkowskian space-time which is also independent from the physical systems that occupy it. This
view of space-time is not assumed in general relativity.
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and the space-time coordinates x, the dynamical variables (Qk, IIk) of a system in space-time
must be “sharply distinguished” from the space-time coordinates (x, t).23
Hilgevoord states that making this distinction, although seemingly obvious, is important
because dynamical variables and coordinates have different properties. Whereas the variables
represent point particles that have mass, position, velocity, and acceleration, space-time
coordinates do not have any of the properties listed above. Like the Cartesian coordinate system
used to map physical systems, space-time is assumed to be a fixed, independent, continuous
background that extends linearly with its values ranging from -∞ to +∞ where each space-time
interval is determined by a unit vector. Just like dynamical variables and coordinates represent
different concepts, so do physical systems and space-time. The properties of space-time do not
have to be the same as the properties of physical systems. For example, whereas space is
supposed to possess both translational and rotational symmetry and time is supposed to possess
translational symmetry, physical systems do not. Hilgevoord states that it is the assumed
symmetry of space and time that allows for the three spatial coordinates x and the time
coordinate t to be joined together via Lorentz transformations to form the four components in a
four-vector. That is, the four space-time coordinates can be treated as a single vector. However,
based on the distinction mentioned above, the dynamical variables representing physical systems
cannot be components of a single four-vector with the position dynamical variable qn combined
with time coordinate t. This is because since q represents a dynamical variable of a physical
system and t represents a space-time coordinate—i.e. they represent different concepts with
23

Since time as a parameter t and time as a dynamical variable have very different properties, Hilgevoord’s

distinction provides more than just another name for time. That is, this is not an issue of nomenclature. He is
stating that the word “time” is used to refer to different concepts. As such, he is implying that at the root of the
problem of time is the failure to recognize the many types of time that exist.
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different properties. As a result, t and q should not be combined to mirror the close connection
between x, y, z and t established by Lorentz transformations.
In quantum mechanics, space-time and physical systems also have different properties.
Whereas space-time is fixed and unquantized (continuous), the dynamical variables of physical
systems are quantized. In quantum mechanics, space-time points are represented by c-number
coordinates x, t and dynamical variables are represented by operators. For example, the
dynamical variable for position q is represented by the multiplication operator and the dynamical
variable for momentum p is represented by the differential operator. Like in classical mechanics,
coordinates should not be equivocated with dynamical variables because they have different
properties (Hilgevoord, 2002). The problems that result from not making this distinction can be
demonstrated by describing the effects it would have on uncertainty relations. If we treat x as a
dynamical variable in a physical system, then x will have the property of being a fixed point in
space. Furthermore, if x = q, then x will also be the conjugate variable of momentum p. As such,
x will also be part of the uncertainty relation ∆x∆p ≥ −iħ. However, if x is a fixed point, then the
system’s momentum p will tend towards infinity. This implies that a measure of system’s
momentum cannot be obtained. If this situation is to be avoided, then x should be distinguished
from q. It should be noted that such a situation does not occur with q because it is not a fixed
point in space. This shows how the different properties of x and q have will affect systems in
different ways.
Such problems also occur with the energy-time uncertainty relation. In quantum
mechanics, the time-value of a particle system is denoted by the parameter t instead of by the
dynamical variable that represents time. An example of the lack of a dynamical variable for time
is found in the time dependent wave function Ψ(x, t).
12

Hilgevoord states, “the notation suggest

that x and t are quantities of the same type and leads to the question why t, the universal time
coordinate, is not an operator like x” (p. 303). If the parameter t is equivocated with the
dynamical variable for time, then there is no operator for time. In quantum mechanics, the
parameter t is used to represents the canonical conjugate variable to the Hamiltonian H. As such,
t is expected to satisfy the commutation relation [t, H]=iħ (Auletta, 2001). This expectation leads
to a problem because if t is to represent the universal operator for time, then its eigenvalues in
any system should be continuous and include every number from -∞ to +∞.24 This is because
although t is used to represent a dynamical variable, its properties are assumed to be those of a
coordinate number. That is, t represents fixed points in space-time that are independent,
continuous, and extends linearly with values ranging from -∞ to +∞. Since H is the conjugate
variable of t, this implies that every eigenvalue of any H should also have the same properties as
the eigenvalues of t. For example, as the conjugate variable of t, H is also supposed to have
eigenvalues that are continuous and that range from -∞ to +∞. However, Wolfgang Pauli
showed that there is no operator for time that will satisfy this relation. When the operator
representing the Hamiltonian does not have continuous eigenvalues ranging from -∞ to +∞, there
cannot be an operator for time because it would result in negative energy values (Pauli, 1980).
The Hamiltonian must be bounded from below in order to obtain positive energy values and the
ground state of the energy of a system (Auletta, 2001). Thus, there cannot be a universal
operator for time that has the properties of the coordinate t. As a result, time has to be treated as
a parameter t. This is the main problem with time in quantum mechanics.
However, Hilgevoord (2002) notes that the lack of a universal operator is only a problem
if the properties of all physical systems are expected to be the same as the properties of the

24

It should cover the entire real number spectrum.
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space-time continuum. Yet not all systems have such properties. Thus, Pauli’s theorem is a
genuine concern for only some systems. For example, Pauli showed that a universal operator
cannot represent systems with discrete energy eigenvalues, but not all systems are discrete.
Some systems do have continuous energy eigenvalues. For such systems, there can be an
operator that functions in the same way that a universal operator should function. This is
because the system has the same properties as the space-time coordinates. That is, the system is
fixed and unquantized with eigenvalues that range from -∞ to +∞. According to Hilgevoord,
Pauli’s theorem does not apply to such systems.25 However, the problem still remains for
systems that don’t share the same properties as the space-time coordinates such as systems with
discrete energy eigenvalues or systems that are bounded from below. For this reason, an
operator has to be established that can adequately measure and account for the particular nature
of the physical system that is being measured. In order to find an operator for time, Hilgevoord
proposes that a dynamical variable for time should be established. The time variable for time
should have the same type of relation to the coordinate t as the dynamical position variable q has
to the coordinates x. As Hilgevoord states, “Just as a position variable indicates the position of a
system in space, a clock variable indicates the position of a system in time” (p.302). This
dynamical time variable will be found in a particular type of physical system—i.e. clocks.
Hilgevoord defines a clock as any physical system that can be described by a dynamical variable
25

A physical system that has these properties is said to be an open system. The energy in such systems is

unbounded. However, in order for a system to be stable, its Hamiltonian must be bounded from below. As a result,
there cannot be an operator that has negative eigenvalues. Pauli’s objection to a universal operator still applies to
these systems. Nevertheless, Hilgevoord states that the demand for a lower bound to the Hamiltonian values does
not apply for isolated systems. This implies that the only systems that bypass Pauli’s argument are isolated
continuous systems.
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that mirrors the behavior of the t coordinate under time translation. For example, a dynamical
time variable can be a pointer position, an angle, or a momentum.26 The corresponding operator
for a dynamical time variable can also be represented by different functions. The type of
functions that will define the time operator will depend on the dynamical time variable used to
describe the physical system that will serve as a clock. Each physical system/clock will have a
unique time operator. Some dynamical physical systems will have discrete time variables, others
will have continuous time variables, and others will not have time variables. As Hilgevoord
states:
“If we are to look for a time operator in quantum mechanics, we should not try to
quantize the universal time coordinate but consider timelike (in the literal sense)
dynamical variables of specific physical systems, that is, clocks. Because a clock
variable is an ordinary dynamical variable, quantization should not, in principle, be
especially problematic.” (p.303)
Hilgevoord shows how ordinary operators can be used to represent time variables in three
different types of physical systems—i.e. linear quantum clocks, continuous cyclic quantum
clocks, and discrete cyclic quantum clocks. It must be remembered that whatever operator is
used to represent the dynamical time variable, it has to satisfy the conjugate commutation
relation for the time and energy [η, H]=0, [θ, H]=iħ. It is important to note that although this is
also a conjugate commutation relation for time and energy, it is not the same as the conjugate
commutation relation [t, H]=iħ. Whereas the former is a relation for time and energy operators,
the latter is for time as a parameter t and a Hamiltonian operator. This distinction is important

26

E.P. Wigner (1957) introduced the notion of a quantum clock. Others that discuss the nature of quantum clocks

include A. Peres (1980) and C. Rovelli (1991).
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because it takes into account Pauli’s argument. Whereas the [t, H]=iħ conjugate commutation
relation is not possible, the [η, H]=0, [θ, H]=iħ conjugate commutation relations is possible.
Hilgevoord notes how in the case of a linear quantum clock, the conjugate commutation relation
for time and energy is satisfied under the following conditions:
1) θ is the multiplication operator.
2) η= - iħd/dθ.
3) H= η.
4) θ and η are operators that satisfy the relation [θ, η]=iħ.
5) θ, η, and H have eigenvalues that span over the entire real axis.
In the linear quantum clock, the Hamiltonian has continuous eigenvalues. Furthermore, the
operator θ has the similar functions as the universal time parameter t. This is because both have
continuous eigenvalues ranging from -∞ to +∞. The continuous cyclic quantum clock works
similarly to linear quantum clock. The difference is that the intervals that define the function for
the time operator are finite. For the continuous quantum clock, the energy is unbounded yet it
has discrete energy eigenvalues. To illustrate the nature of a continuous quantum clock,
Hilgevoord uses the following analogy: “[this] is precisely the behavior we expect of the hand of
a clock: it rotates at constant angular velocity and after an arbitrarily short time, an eigenstate |φ>
of the hand position goes to an orthogonal state” (p. 304). Like the continuous quantum clock,
the discrete quantum clock has discrete energy eigenvalues. The difference is that the discrete
quantum clock’s time translations are also discrete. To illustrate the nature of the discrete
quantum clock, Hilgevoord uses the following analogy: “this behavior brings to mind the famous
clock in the railway station that can only show discrete times” (p. 305). By considering different
physical systems such as clocks, Hilgevoord is able to show how depending on the system,
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dynamical variables can be established and represented by “well behaved” ordinary operators.
According to Hilgevoord, Pauli’s argument only applies if we expect the time operator to be
universal and behave exactly as the c-number t. This expectation is a result of not
acknowledging the differences between dynamical variables and space-time coordinates.
Although Hilgevoord argues in “Time and Quantum Mechanics” that any physical
system that qualifies as a clock can yield a specific time operator that will satisfy the energy-time
uncertainty relation, he does not provide a general formula for the energy-time uncertainty
relation that can apply to all types of clocks. However, he does so in his article “The Uncertainty
Principle for Energy and Time” (Hilgevood, 2006). Instead of focusing on finding clock and
energy variables that can be represented by operators, Hilgevoord uses the lifetime and the
energy width of a quantum state to show how operators can be used to satisfy a version of the
time-energy uncertainty relation that can apply to any system. He states that in an arbitrary
closed system, its lifetime and energy width can be derived from the equation <Ψ|U(a)|Ψ>=∫
eiaE|<E|Ψ>|2 dE where <Ψ|U(a)|Ψ> is the transition or survival amplitude of the state of the
system |Ψ> and the square of its absolute value |<Ψ|U(a)|Ψ>|2 is the probability of finding the
state of the system |Ψ> in its initial state after an interval of time a has passed. The lifetime of a
physical system β can be defined in terms of the equation <Ψ|U(τβ)|Ψ>= β

(β<1) where τβ is the

smallest time interval that satisfies this equation. For example, for the half-life of a system, β
will equal √1/2 and τ√1/2 will the smallest time interval in which there is a 50% probability of
finding the system in its initial state. The energy width of a physical system W can be defined in
terms of the equation ∫ Wα|<E|Ψ>|2 dE=α (α<1) where Wα is the smallest energy interval that
satisfies this equation. For example, when α=0.9, Wα will be the smallest energy interval that
can contain 90% of the energy distribution of a system. From the latter three equations, the
17

energy-time uncertainty relation τβ Wα ≥ 2ħ arccos ((β+1 − α)/α),

(β ≤ 2α −1) can be established

which is valid for all states |Ψ>. For the examples given above, this relation would be τ√1/2 W0.9 ≥
0.9ħ (p.1455).

18

Exposition of the Ontology of Time Unaddressed by Hilgevoord
Although Hilgevoord addresses how time as an operator should be dealt with in quantum
mechanics, he does not address what his approach says about the ontology of time. Hilgevoord
argues that if time is to be dealt with properly in quantum mechanics, it should not be equated
with the time coordinate t. In fact, Pauli showed that such a conception of time is problematic
because time as a parameter is not an observable (dynamical variable) and as such, it cannot be
represented by an operator. Hilgevoord shows that Pauli’s argument applies only if time is
represented by a universal operator. However, instead of accepting that time cannot exist as an
observable and confining it to a parameter, time can be seen as an observable that is dependent
on physical systems. If time is measured in terms of observables such clock variables, time
variables, or the lifetime of a system, an ordinary operator for time can be determined.
Furthermore, he shows that the measure of time as an observable will vary from system to
system. This implies that time is not an independent observable that is extrinsic to a physical
system. Instead, time is internal to the physical system being measured. In this sense, time is
derived from physical systems. However, this is a claim about the ontology of time that
Hilgevoord does not quite address. Instead, he just makes claims about the impact his approach
has on the epistemological accounts of time. He states:
“It seems plausible that the notions of space and time are derived from the properties of
material bodies. The q’s and w’s would then correspond to more primitive notions of
space and time than the x’s and t, the latter being abstractions from the former. We may
speculate that the concrete notions of time as they are connected with periodic changes
would have led to the abstract notion of a single linear time extending from minus to plus
infinity. Similarly, the local notions of space as derived from the behavior of material
19

bodies would have led to the abstract notion of an infinitely extended linear space. Thus
there would have originated the idea of an empty, infinitely extended linear space time,
the stage on which the drama of nature unfolds and the starting point of most
considerations in theoretical physics since Newton” (Hilgevoord, 1996, p. 1454).
In this quote, Hilgevood is only making claims about the way that time is perceived to be
based on observations of physical systems. He does not explicitly state time itself depends on
physical systems. To him, what depend on physical systems are the claims that we can make
about time. The fact that Hilgevoord is hesitant about making claims about the ontology of time
can be seen in both articles. For example, although Hilgevoord (1996) shows that time can be
represented by dynamical variables and operators, he claims that such observables pertain to
“‘timelike’ canonical variables” (p.1451). That is, instead of claiming that these observables are
measuring time, he claims that they are measuring something that is similar to time. Although
Hilgevoord does not explicitly state what these timelike variables are measuring, it is can be
inferred from the formulas he is using that they are measuring the amount of change that a
system undergoes. If the “Relationism with Respect to Time” or the “Reductionism with
Respect to Time” approach in philosophy is taken, then these timelike variables are precisely
measuring time. As a consequence, the “Absolutism with Respect to Time” or the
“Substantivalism with Respect to Time” approach in philosophy cannot be valid.
Furthermore, Hilgevoord’s (2002) hesitation is displayed when he separates space-time
from physicals systems. For example, his analysis of the problem of time assumes that physical
systems are independent from a continuous space-time background. Although he acknowledges
that this assumption is an important issue, he is not willing to consider any other alternatives. He
states, “How the existence of this space and time background is to be justified is an important
20

and difficult question into which I will not enter” (p.301). Another example of Hilgevoord’s
separation of space-time from physical systems is found in his claim that they do not need to
have the same properties. Whereas space is supposed to possess both translational and
rotational symmetry and time is supposed to possess translational symmetry, physical systems do
not. As Hilgevoord states, “it is important to note that individual physical systems in space-time
need not show these symmetries” (p.301). The separation of space-time from physical systems
shows how Hilgevoord remains largely unconcerned with the implications of not providing an
accurate account of the nature of time using formalism/mathematical tools that assume that time
can be represented as being continuous, independent, and absolute.
However, I am proposing that the ontological implications of Hilgevoord’s work should
be taken into account when describing the nature of time.27 If this is done, then time itself is
dependent on physical systems. As a result, time as an observable cannot exist if there are no
physical systems. This implies that time cannot be an independent substance or background
where physical systems are contained. The account of the ontology of time I am proposing
suggests that time is an internal property of physical systems themselves.28 Thus, accounts in
standard quantum mechanics and in philosophy that claiming that time is an independent
background does not address the nature of time appropriately. If this is the case, then the
formalism/mathematical tools used in quantum mechanics suggesting that time is independent
from physical systems should be not be used. For example, since the parameter t does not
adequately represent the nature of physical systems, it should not be used as a mathematical tool
27

Due to the interconnection between space and time that was demonstrated by Einstein’s theory of relativity, the

claims made about time can also apply to space. However, since the focus of this thesis is time, I do not address
how such claims also apply to space. For this reason, I limit myself to only making claims about the nature of time.
28

This will be explored in greater detail in the next section of this thesis.
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to account for the succession of events (time). Just as Einstein replaced the Cartesian coordinate
system for the Gaussian coordinate system in order to account for the effects of gravity on spacetime (Einstein, 2005),29 the parameter t should be replaced by operators like those use by
Hilgevoord that indicate change. Doing so will help address the problems of time in quantum
mechanics more effectively.

29

This will be explored in greater detail in the next section of this thesis.
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Implications of an Ontological Account of Time
A consequence of claiming that time is an intrinsic property of physical systems is that
every physical system has its own measure of time and that these time measurements are defined
in relation to the physical system being measured and to those doing the measuring. Another
consequence of this approach to time is that time cannot be independent from physical/material
systems. As a result, time cannot have the same properties throughout an independently existing
background or stage where physical systems are placed. If these ontological implications of
Hilgevoord’s work are taken into account, then the picture of time that arise in quantum
mechanics is analogous to the one proposed by Einstein in the theory of special30 and general
relativity.31
30

In the theory of special relativity, Einstein (2005) proves how space and time are dependent on each other. He

also proves how time and space are not containers that have absolute values that are independent of the reference
frame used to measure the motion of objects. He does this by showing that there cannot be an absolute measure of
simultaneity through a simple thought experiment. The distance from point A to point B is measured with an
observer placed at midpoint M. Lightning strikes at both points A and B. If the lightning strikes at both point A and
point B at the same time, then these events are simultaneous. However, the law of propagation of light in
electromagnetism states that the fastest light can travel in vacuum is c=300,00km/sec. Due to this limit, the
information received at midpoint M will depend on the distance that light has to travel from point A to point M and
from point B to point M. If the distances that light traverses are equal, then simultaneity can be claimed. A
consequence of this is that it can no longer be concluded that absolute simultaneity is possible. Furthermore, since
distance is a measure of space, and simultaneity is a measure of time, and since simultaneity is dependent on the
distance light travels, then time is dependent on space. However, the special theory of relativity is limited because it
assumes that space-time can be adequately represented by the rigid, uniform reference frames that make up
Minkowskian spacetime. However, Einstein showed in the general theory of relativity that this assumption was
wrong by showing that space-time is affected by the motion of objects. Thus, the theory of special relativity does
not provide an adequate method for measuring the motion of objects. In order for the laws of nature to apply to all
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reference frames in an equal manner, the general theory of relativity had to take into account the uniqueness of each
reference frame and the physical nature of space-time.
31

In the general theory of relativity, Einstein (2005) demonstrated that the nature of space-time is affected by

material objects because they produce gravitational fields. By using a thought experiment that showed the validity
of the equivalence principle, Einstein demonstrated how both acceleration and gravity will have the same affect on
an object. He does this by constructing a scenario where a chest is suspended in a region of empty space. Inside this
chest is an observer equipped with a measuring apparatus. A rope is attached to a hook placed in the middle of the
lid of this chest. If the rope is pulled with a constant force, then chest will move up at a uniform accelerated velocity.
The standing observer will feel the pressure produced by the acceleration. If the observer compares his experiences
inside the chest to his experiences on the Earth, and the observer has knowledge of gravitational fields, then the
observer will conclude that the chest is being affected by a gravitational field. If the observer hangs an object from
the rope, the rope will stretch downwards. As a result, the rope experiences a tension. The observer explains that
since the rope is attached to the chest, the accelerated motion experience by the chest is transmitted to the rope.
Thus, the observer concludes that the inertial mass of the object is determining the amount of the tension
experienced by the rope. Now, the same chest is placed on earth. The rope also stretches downward. However, the
observer provides a different explanation of why this occurs. He concludes that the gravitational mass of the object
is determining the amount of tension experienced by the rope. Since the amount of tension on the rope is the same
in both scenarios, the equality of inertial mass and gravitational mass is confirmed. A consequence of this is that
any physical object that has acceleration will have a corresponding gravitational field. Since gravitational fields
influence the trajectory of objects, a theory about the nature of the space-time continuum needs to take into
consideration the effects of gravity. Such a theory must also show how space-time is affected by the motion of
objects. This is because gravity fields will curve space-time. In Appendix V of Relativity, Einstein explains how in
general relativity space-time does not have a separate existence from gravitational fields. As Einstein states, “There
is no such thing as an empty space, i.e. a space without field. Space-time does not claim existence on its own, but
only as a structural quality of the field” (p.176). This implies that views which treat space-time as independent of
matter cannot be correct. Einstein states, “According to the general theory of relativity, the geometrical properties
of space-time are not independent, but they are determined by matter” (p.143).
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In SR, Einstein (2005) demonstrated how measures of time and space are established by
physical events. That is, time-values and space-values32 are dependent on the physical
phenomenon that is being measured from arbitrarily established reference frames.33 For example,
if a time-value is to be obtained, then it can be establish by using a clock. Einstein showed how
a clock can be constructed out of any physical system that is arbitrarily established. The physical
system that Einstein chose to prove that there is no absolute measure of simultaneity included
two lightning strikes, a train, and an embankment. I am proposing that a similar approach to
time should be followed in quantum mechanics. Hilgevoord showed how measures of time are
dependent on physical systems. The dynamic variables used to represent time are arbitrarily
chosen. For example, time can be represented by momentum variables, lifetime variables, angle
variables, etc. Regardless of the variable chosen, such variable is an intrinsic property34 of the

32

Although I am arguing that time is dependent, I will not address the dependence time has on space since the focus

of my thesis is on time. Although this approach to time facilitates the merging of space and time because now they
can both be represented by operators that can be combined into components of a four vector, doing so is beyond the
scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, this approach is compatible with relativistic quantum mechanics. Hilgevoord
(1996) states, “Evidently, these [uncertainty] relations fit easily in a relativistic formulation of quantum mechanics.
Space and time then merge into space-time and Pk and H become the components of a four vector” (p.1455). The
work being done in relativistic quantum mechanics can address these issues more adequately.
33

Both Einstein and I are proposing a “Reductionist with Respect to Time” philosophical approach.

34

The claim that time is an intrinsic property of physical systems or objects has spurred a philosophical debate on

the role of time on identity between perdurance and endurance theorists. Perdurance theorists claim that objects are
composed of temporal parts or stages. Each part is only present at a particular point in time. It is the summation of
all these parts that gives an object its complete identity. Endurance theorists claim that objects have spatial parts,
but no temporal parts. The complete object exists at every point in time. Under this view, the identity of an object
is what endures through time (Noonan, 2006).
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physical system that is being measured much in the same way that the lightning strike is a
physical system and its velocity c is an intrinsic property of light. Furthermore, just like values
for the same physical phenomenon are different depending on the reference frame that is used to
measure them in the theory of relativity, so should they be in quantum mechanics. That is, time
is relative. In relativity, every reference frame is stationary in relation to itself. If any measure
of change is to be observed, then another reference must be established. Only then can a
measurement value be obtained for intrinsic properties/dynamical variables. For example, a car
moving at 60 miles per hour from the reference frame of the Earth is stationary from its own
reference frame. If the reference frame provided by the Earth is not used, then the value of 60
miles per hour cannot be obtained. If only the reference frame of the car is used, then no
measurement value can be obtained because the car is not in motion in relation to itself. In a
similar manner, I am proposing that if a measurement value for any physical systems is to be
obtained, then there needs to be another physical system that is doing the measuring. This
implies that it is not just because of the chosen reference frame that values for time will be
different. The time-values are different because the physical systems that are both measuring
and being measured are different from other systems. For example, if a time value is to be
derived from the lifetime of the physical system A, another physical system B that has its own
internal clock is needed to measure the lifetime of physical system A. Thus, time is a property of
physical system A as measured by physical system B. The time value for system A will be
different if measured by another physical system C. In this sense, time is dependent on both the
physical system that is being measured and relative to the physical system that is doing the
measurement. The approach I am suggesting coincides with Barbour’s (2008) approach to time
in “The Nature of Time” where he claims that “it is not a clock that we must define but clocks
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and the correlations between them” (p.7). Since different systems will have different types of
clocks, the dynamical evolution of a system will be established by a comparison between these
different types of clocks.
In GR, Einstein (2005) demonstrated how physical objects distort space-time due to
gravity. This showed that the account of space-time as an entity that is independent and
unaffected by physical objects is inaccurate. Furthermore, this implies that an accurate measure
of time will have to include the effects of gravity.35 If physical systems are used to measure time,
and dynamical variables of physical systems are affected by the gravitational fields of other
physical systems, then the effects of gravity and the interaction between physical systems should
be taken into account when obtaining a measurement value for time. This is especially the case
in quantum mechanics since the interaction between physical systems affects the properties of
these systems. For example, the double-slit experiment shows how the electron can display
particle and wave behavior depending on the interaction between the electron and the measuring
apparatus. If the physical system used as a clock is an electron and the dynamical variable used
as a measure of time is the electron’s momentum, then the interaction between the apparatus and
the electron must be taken into account because of the uncertainty relation between momentum
and position. In quantum mechanics, the interaction and the relation between different physical
systems do more than just distort space-time like Einstein had claimed. This interaction changes
the nature of physical systems and as a result, it both changes and creates the properties time. If
Hilgevoord’s work accurately describes the nature of time as dependent on physical systems,
then physical systems (including gravity fields) cannot exist without time and time cannot exist
without physical systems. To Einstein, there cannot be space-time without physical objects to

35

Ephemeris time includes gravitational effects.
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produce gravitational fields. It is not so much the physical objects themselves, but the fields they
create that distort space-time. However, I am proposing that it is the physical systems
themselves and the relation/interaction between them that gives rise to time.36

36

Since gravity is part of physical systems, any accurate measure of time must include the effects of gravity.

However, exploring such effects is beyond the scope of this thesis. Work in quantum field theory and quantum
gravity can address this issue more adequately.
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Conclusion
The purpose of my thesis was to gain a better understanding about the problem of time in
quantum mechanics. I aimed to explore the role that time plays in quantum mechanics and why
it cannot be represented by a canonical operator. The research I have done suggests that time
cannot be an operator because it is treated as a parameter instead of as a dynamical variable. As
Hilgevoord claims, if this distinction is acknowledged, it becomes possible to find an operator
for time. A consequence of taking this approach is that time becomes a property of physical
systems. As such, time cannot be an independent background that physical systems occupy. In
order to show how this is the case, my thesis focused on: 1) presenting Hilgevoord’s argument
about the problems of time in quantum mechanics; 2) providing an account of the ontology of
time based on Hilgevoord’s work; and 3) providing an analysis of the implications of what I am
proposing in connection to Einstein’s insights in special and general relativity. However, there
are still many issues with time that could not be discussed here. In order to have a better
understanding of the role of time in quantum mechanics and the problems it presents, the
interdependence between time and space must be explored. Furthermore, a better understanding
of the relation between time and gravity also has to be explored. These are topics that can be
better addressed by research being done in areas such as relativistic quantum mechanics,
quantum field theory, and quantum gravity.
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